Known limits

Ódinn Forge v0.4.0-beta.3 has three hard limits:

1. Forked workers are crash containment, not a security sandbox.
2. Remote hosting is application-level tenant isolation, not hostile-user OS isolation.
3. External effects and nondeterministic provider behavior are outside full replay and rollback guarantees.

Single-user gateway

The local gateway is loopback-only and must not be exposed directly to a network. Use the separate TLS host for remote access.

External effects

An approval, recovery journal, capsule, Rewind snapshot, or counterfactual branch cannot guarantee reversal of a purchase, message, deletion, account change, or other remote mutation.

Interrupted browser mutations may have an unknown outcome. Ódinn blocks later mutations until the operator resolves that state; it does not guess.

Model and provider behavior

Live availability, quotas, model identity, rate limits, authentication, output quality, and nondeterministic responses depend on the configured provider or local server.

A passing local protocol smoke does not prove a live provider account.

Hostile code

Unconfined extensions run with the Ódinn OS user’s authority. Container restrictions reduce authority but are not a universal guarantee against every hostile workload. Use independent OS or infrastructure isolation when the code is mutually untrusted.

Integrity

Run and audit verification detect local journal damage. They do not provide tamper-proof storage against an attacker who controls the state directory and its keys.

Public beta

Breaking changes and provider-specific rough edges remain possible. Do not use the beta as a safety-critical service. Check Public beta status before relying on a platform or provider path.